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1. Introduction
The purpose of this study is to examine life insurance
holdings and financial vulnerabilities among couples over the life
cycle.  Two separate concerns motivate our analysis.  First, there
are reasons to suspect that life insurance coverage is poorly
correlated with underlying financial vulnerabilities.  A well-
known insurance industry adage holds that life insurance is “sold
and not bought.”  Alternatively, households may purchase long-term
policies relatively early in life, and subsequently fail to adjust
coverage appropriately because of  inertia and/or other
psychological considerations.  Second, households that purchase
little or no life insurance may leave either or both spouses at
risk of serious financial consequences.
With respect to the first concern, the available evidence is
limited.  Using a sample of older workers drawn from the 1992 wave
of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), Bernheim et al. [2001]
documented a startling mismatch between life insurance holdings
and underlying vulnerabilities (defined as the decline in living
standard that a survivor would experience in the absence of
insurance).  In particular, they found virtually no correlation
between these two variables.  Notably, this finding did not permit
them to distinguish between the hypothesis that insurance bears
little relation to needs at the time of purchase, and the
hypothesis that households purchase long-term contracts with
initially appropriate insurance coverage, but fail to adjust this
coverage through time as their circumstances change.
The second concern has received considerably more attention.3
 One branch of the literature examines the experience of  widows.
 Holden, Burkhauser, and Myers [1986] and Hurd and Wise [1989]
documented sharp declines in living standards and increases in
poverty rates (from 9 to 35 percent) among women whose husbands
actually passed away.  A second branch of the literature projects
the consequences of widowhood for married individuals.  Analyzing
data gathered during the 1960s from households in middle age
through early retirement, Auerbach and Kotlikoff [1987, 1991a,
1991b] found that roughly one-third of wives and secondary earners
would have seen their living standards decline by 25 percent or
more had their spouses died.  Bernheim et al. [2001] adopted a
similar approach, but used more recent, high quality data, more
accurate estimates of survival-contingent income streams, and a
more elaborate life cycle simulation model.  They documented
significant underlying vulnerabilities among older working
couples: ignoring life insurance, one-third of secondary earners
would have experienced significant (20 percent or greater)
declines in living standards had their spouses died in 1992, while
one-fifth would have experience severe declines (40 percent or
greater).  More importantly, only one in three households in these
at-risk populations held sufficient life insurance to avert
significant or severe financial consequences.  While primary
earners (typically husbands) were less frequently at-risk of
significant or severe consequences, they generally had much less
protection (insurance on the secondary earner’s life) for any
given level of risk exposure.  Notably, none of the studies
mentioned above examined uninsured exposures among younger
households.  This is a significant omission, as younger couples4
generally have more contingent income to protect, and hence
greater underlying vulnerabilities.
In the current study, we reexamine both sets of issues using
data obtained from the 1995 wave of the Survey of Consumer
Finances (SCF).  Relative to the HRS (studied by Bernheim, et al.
2001), the primary advantage of the SCF is that it includes adult
respondents of all ages.  This permits us to extend the existing
literature by examining financial vulnerabilities and life
insurance coverage at all stages of the life cycle.  This
extension comes at a cost, as the SCF data are in some ways less
comprehensive.  Most notably, matching Social Security earnings
histories are not available for the SCF sample. 
Following Bernheim, et al. [2001], we adopt a concrete and
easily understood yardstick for quantifying financial
vulnerabilities: the percentage decline in an individual’s
sustainable living standard that would result from a spouse’s
death.
1   The use of this yardstick permits us to make apples-to-
apples comparisons of vulnerabilities across households, and to
investigate correlations between vulnerabilities and insurance
coverage.  We also compare actual life insurance holdings to a
natural benchmark, defined as the level of coverage required to
assure survivors of no change in their sustainable living
standard.  It is worth emphasizing that we do not regard this
benchmark as a definitive standard of adequacy or rationality. 
                     
1To calculated this decline, we make use of an elaborate life cycle
model.  The model is embodied in financial planning software, Economic
Security Planner (or ESPlanner).  Economic Security Planning, Inc. provides
free copies of the software for academic research.  For additional
information, consult      www.ESPlanner.com.     5
Rational decision makers may elect to purchase either higher or
lower levels of insurance.  However, when combined with other
evidence on household objectives, comparisons with the benchmark
potentially shed light on the adequacy of life insurance coverage.
With respect to the first issue, we corroborate the previous
finding of Bernheim, et al. [2001] (based on the HRS) that there
is little correlation between financial vulnerabilities and life
insurance holdings.  Our analysis further illuminates this issue
by demonstrating that the correlation is essentially zero
throughout the entire life cycle.  This finding is consistent with
the hypothesis that life insurance bears little relation to needs
at the time of purchase; however, it tends to refute the
hypothesis that households purchase long-term contracts with
initially appropriate insurance coverage, but fail to adjust this
coverage through time as their circumstances change.
With respect to the second issue, we find that uninsured
vulnerabilities are considerably greater among  younger couples. 
This is particularly noteworthy because, as mentioned above,
younger couples were not included in previous studies.  Nearly
two-thirds of secondary earners between the ages of 22 and 39 have
significant uninsured financial vulnerabilities (projected
reductions in living standards exceeding 20 percent), and nearly
one-third have severe uninsured vulnerabilities (projected
reductions exceeding 40 percent).  Moreover, for this age group,
only one in five households with at-risk secondary earners (those
who would experience significant or severe declines in living
standard upon the death of their spouse, ignoring insurance) held
sufficient life insurance to avert significant or severe financial6
consequences.  For the entire sample, in the absence of life
insurance, 56 percent of secondary earners and 6 percent of
primary earners would have experienced significant or severe
declines in living standard upon the death of a spouse.  Actual
life insurance holdings reduce these figures to, respectively, 42
percent and 5 percent.  Thus, the overall impact of life insurance
holdings on financial vulnerabilities among at-risk households is
modest.  Roughly two-thirds of poverty among surviving women and
more than one-third of poverty among surviving men resulted from a
failure to ensure survivors of an undiminished living standard
through insurance. 
We also find evidence of a significant gender bias in life
insurance holdings.  Specifically, for any given level of
financial vulnerabilities, couples provide significantly more
protection for wives than for husbands.  For example, couples with
severely at-risk wives on average hold $166,628 of life insurance,
while couples with severely at-risk husbands on average hold only
15 percent of this amount ($24,827). :Life insurance reduced the
average impact of a husband’s death on the living standard of a
severely at-risk wife from a 65.5 percent decline to a 47.6
percent decline.  In contrast, life insurance reduced the average
impact of a wife’s death on the living standard of a severely at-
risk husband by a much smaller amount, from a 68.4 percent decline
to a 64.1 percent decline.
The paper proceeds as follows: section 2 discusses methods,
section 3 describes the data, section 4 presents basic results,
section 5 provides sensitivity analysis, and section 6 concludes.
2.  A Strategy for Measuring Financial Vulnerabilities7
A. Concepts
We clarify our strategy for measuring financial
vulnerabilities through an example.  Imagine that a husband and
wife each live for at most two years (equivalently, they are
within two years of maximum lifespan).  Both are alive initially,
but either may die before the second year.  The household’s well-
being depends on consumption in each year and survival
contingency.  As discussed further below, we allow for the
possibility that some ongoing expenditures are either exogenous or
determined early in life by “sticky” choices.  We refer to these
expenditures as “fixed consumption,” and to residual spending as
“variable consumption.”  Let y1 denote initial assets plus first
period earnings net of fixed consumption, and let y2s denote second
period earnings net of fixed consumption in state s = W, H, B,
where the state identifies survivors (wife, W, husband, H, or
both, B).  The couple divides first period resources between
variable consumption, c1, saving, A, and insurance premiums, piLi, i
=  H, W, where Li represents the second-period payment to  i if his
or her spouse dies, and pi denotes the associated price per dollar
of coverage.  Assets A earn the rate of return r.  The couple
faces the following constraints: c1 = y1 - A - pWLW - pHLH, c2B = y2B +
A(1+r), and c2i = y2i + A(1+r) + Li for i = W, H, where c2i denotes
second period variable consumption in state i (for the moment, we
ignore non-negativity restrictions on life insurance and assets) 
Defining  p    -    p    -    ) r + (1       p H W
-1
B ≡ , these equations imply:8
We equate living standard with per capita variable
consumption adjusted for family composition.  To determine each
individual’s living standard when both are alive, we divide
variable consumption by a factor 2
·.  We assume that 0 < · ≤  1; the
second inequality reflects economies of scale associated with
shared living expenses.  To maintain a living standard that is
constant across time and states of nature (in other words, one
that is undiminished if and when either spouse dies), the couple
must spend 2
·C dollars in every period and state where both are
alive for every C dollars in any state where only one survives. 
From (1), it is apparent that the household’s highest sustainable
living standard is:
The couple can guarantee that spouse j’s death will not diminish
i’s living standard from its highest sustainable level, c
*, by
purchasing a life insurance policy with face value
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We measure underlying financial vulnerabilities by comparing
an individual’s highest sustainable living standard, c
*, with
r) + (1 A     +    y       c i 2
n
i ≡ , which represents the living standard he or she
                     
2In the special case where the household has Leontief preferences
(defined over per capita adjusted expenditures), this is also the utility
maximizing outcome.
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would enjoy if widowed, ignoring life insurance.  We define the
variable IMPACT (ignoring insurance) as  100   x     1    -   
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, i = W,H.
This is a measure of the percent by which the survivor’s living
standard would, with no insurance protection, fall short of or
exceed the couple’s highest sustainable living standard. 
Similarly, we measure uninsured financial vulnerabilities by
comparing c




i ≡ , which represents the living
standard that the individual would actually enjoy if widowed,
based on actual life insurance coverage, L
a
i .  We define the
variable IMPACT (actual) as 100   x     1    -   
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 .  This is a measure of
the percent by which the survivor’s living standard would, given
actual levels of coverage, fall short of or exceed the couple’s
highest sustainable living standard.  The IMPACT variables are
based on a concrete and easily understood yardstick for
quantifying the consequences of a spouse’s death.
3  We also compare
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For the preceding example, we implicitly assumed that
individuals could borrow at the rate r and issue survival-
contingent claims at the prices pH and pW.  As a practical matter,
households encounter liquidity constraints.  They are also
                     
3Note that, when actual life insurance is below the benchmark, the
intact couple saves on insurance premiums, so its actual consumption exceeds
c
*.  Hence, the IMPACT variables understate the change in living standard that
an individual experiences upon a spouse’s death.  However, since life
insurance premiums typically account for a small fraction of expenditures, the
degree of understatement is small.10
typically unable or at least very reluctant to purchase negative
quantities of life insurance (buy annuities).
4  In solving for each
household’s highest sustainable living standard, we take these
restrictions into account, smoothing consumption to the greatest
extent possible.
5 
                     
4A non-negativity constraint for life insurance purchases is equivalent
to the restriction that life annuities are not available for purchase at the
margin.  For further discussion, see Yaari (1965), Kotlikoff and Spivak
(1981), and Bernheim (1987).
5Formally, one can think of the outcome that we identify as the limit of
the solutions to a series of utility maximization problems in which the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution approaches zero.  In the limit (the
Leontief case), the household is actually indifferent with respect to the
distribution of consumption across any years in which its living standard
exceeds the minimum level.
When the life insurance constraint binds, the benchmark
living standard for a survivor, c
*
i  (where i = H or W), may be
greater than the benchmark living standard for the couple while
both spouses are still alive, c
*
B .  This observation raises the
following practical issue: when calculating IMPACT, should we set








?  Were we to use c
*
B , actual IMPACT would be
positive not only for households that depart from the benchmark by




i ), but also for constrained
households that conform to the benchmark by purchasing no11
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Since we wish to use actual IMPACT as a measure of the extent to
which a household deviates from the consumption-smoothed
benchmark, we therefore select c
*
i  rather than c
*
B .  As a result, the
value of IMPACT ignoring insurance is always non-positive (even
though, absent insurance, the survivor’s material living standard
might actually increase upon his or her spouse’s death), and it
equals zero whenever the corresponding benchmark insurance level,
L
*
i , is zero.
B. Implementation
We actually evaluate each household’s financial
vulnerabilities using a more elaborate and realistic life cycle
model.  As mentioned previously, the model is embedded in a
financial planning software program, Economic Security Planner (or
ESPlanner).  Although a complete description of the model would be
prohibitively lengthy, it is important to summarize some key
features.
6
For our base-case calculations, we assume that each
individual lives to a maximum age of 95.  We include children as
members of the household through age 18. We represent household
scale economies as follows: an expenditure of (N + ‚K)
·C, when
there are N adults and K children in the household provides the
                     
6The software has many capabilities that we do not make use of here due
to data limitations.  For example, it can account for a variety of  special
expenditures (college education, weddings, etc.), plans to change homes,
various kinds of state contingent plans (e.g. a non-working wife plans to
return to work and spend less on a child’s education if her husband dies), and
estate plans (including intended bequests).12
same standard of living for each household member as does an
expenditure of C when there is only one adult in the household
(this generalizes the adjustment factor used in our simple
illustration).  The coefficient ‚ is a child-adult equivalency
factor; we set it equal to 0.5.
7   The exponent · captures
economies of scale in shared living.  We set it equal to 0.678,
which implies that a two-adult household must spend 1.6 times as
much as a one-adult household to achieve the same living standard.
8
Insurance needs depend on differences in survival-contingent
income streams.  Consequently, a careful and thorough treatment of
the social security system is essential.  In calculating benefits
for retirement, survivors, parents, children, spouses, and
dependent children, the model accounts for eligibility rules,
early retirement reductions, delayed retirement credits, benefit
re-computation, the legislated phased increase in the normal
retirement age, the earnings test, restrictions on maximum family
                     
7Our child-adult equivalency factor is that used by the OECD (see
Ringen, 1991). Nelson’s (1992) work suggests a smaller value, but she
considers total household expenditures whereas our child-adult equivalency
factor applies only to non-housing consumption expenditure; for our base-case
results, we treat housing expenditure as inflexible.  It appears from Nelson’s
work that a higher equivalency factor is appropriate for non-housing
expenditures.
8The OECD uses a value of 0.7 for · (see Ringen, 1991). Williams, et al.
(1998) consider values of 0.5 for both · and ‚.13
benefits, the wage indexation of average indexed monthly earnings,
and the price indexation of benefits once they are received.
Various characteristics of the tax system, such as rate
structure and the treatment of married couples, can alter
insurance needs by influencing the distribution of after-tax
income across the various survival contingencies.  Consequently, a
careful treatment of taxation is also critical.  The model
calculates federal and state income and payroll taxes for each
year in each survival contingency.
9  It incorporates a wide range
of provisions, including federal deductions and exemptions, the
decision to itemize deductions, the taxation of social security
benefits, the earned income tax credit, the child tax credit, the
phase-out at higher income levels of itemized deductions, and the
indexation of tax brackets to the consumer price index.  In
computing federal deductions, it determines whether the sum of
state income taxes, mortgage interest payments, and property taxes
is large enough to justify itemization. Contributions to tax-
favored retirement savings accounts are excluded from taxable
income, and withdrawals are included.  Though the model determines
total saving simultaneously with life insurance, tax-favored
saving is specified exogenously.
Choices concerning housing may also affect life insurance
needs.  Unlike many other expenditures, housing outlays are not
easily smoothed.  It is difficult to scale mortgage, property tax,
and insurance payments up and down with other expenditures.  Cost
and inconvenience discourage many households from moving or
                     
9The SCF does not contain data on the state of residency.  Therefore, we
assume all households reside in Massachusetts.14
refinancing mortgages; others form psychological attachments to
their homes, and resist changing residences prior to death (Venti
and Wise, 2000).  Moreover, few households access the equity in
their homes through refinancing or reverse annuity mortgages
(Caplin, 2000).  Consequently, for our base-case calculations, we
treat housing as fixed consumption.  In effect, we assume that
couples and survivors remain in the same home until death, and die
with home equity intact.  Formally, we subtract housing expenses
from income off-the-top, itemizing mortgage interest and property
taxes as deductions for federal income tax purposes when it is
optimal to do so, prior to smoothing variable consumption.
Several potentially important factors are omitted from our
analysis.  We do not model uncertainty concerning future income
and non-discretionary expenses (e.g. medical care).  Since small
groups of individuals can share risks to some extent, the adverse
effect of uncertainty on living standard is probably greater for
widows and widowers than for couples.  For this reason, our
analysis tends to understate insurance needs.  We also neglect the
possibility that an individual might remarry after a spouse’s
death.  The extent to which remarriage mitigates the financial
consequences of a spouse’s death depends on one’s view of the
marriage market.
10  Although relatively few elderly individuals
remarry after the death of a spouse (see Bernheim, et al. [2001]),
remarriage is more common among younger households.
Table 1 summarizes some illustrative life insurance
calculations.
11  We begin with a couple consisting of a 40 year-old
                     
10See Lundberg (1999) for a discussion.
11For additional examples, and for comparisons with recommendations15
man earning $45,000 per year, and a 38 year-old woman earning
$25,000 per year.  The man intends to retire at age 64, the woman
at age 63.  They have two children, ages 5 and 7.  The net value
of their non-housing assets is $50,000; in addition, they own a
$150,000 home, and have an unpaid mortgage balance of $120,000. 
They expect their real earnings to grow at the rate of one percent
per year until retirement.  They also expect to earn a real after-
tax return of 3 percent on their non-housing investments. 
According to our model, this couple must purchase $285,922 in term
insurance on the husband’s life, and no insurance on the wife’s
life, to ensure each potential survivor of an undiminished living
standard.  The remainder of the table illustrates the sensitivity
of insurance needs to changes in various household characteristics
and economic parameters.  As one would expect, benchmark life
insurance falls with age and with the earnings of the insured
spouse; it rises with the addition of a child, with an increase in
the rate of earnings growth, and with a reduction in the real
interest rate (these last two changes increase the present
discounted value of future human capital).  There is one
surprising finding: benchmark insurance also rises with the
removal of one child.  This result is attributable to the
associated changes in social security survivor benefits, which are
quantitatively important for the hypothesized family.  For an
otherwise identical family with high income (for which social
security survivor benefits are less important), benchmark
insurance rises monotonically with the number of children. 
                                                                   
generated by Quicken Financial Planner, see Gokhale, Kotlikoff, and Warshawsky
(1999).16
C. Interpretation
We do not regard any single measure of financial
vulnerability as ideal.  Though elaborate, the life cycle model
used in our analysis is still an abstraction, and we have
imperfect information concerning the economic circumstances of
each household (see the Appendix). Nor do we regard the benchmark
level of life insurance as an objective standard of adequacy or
rationality.  Optimal insurance coverage depends on a variety of
considerations, including (but not limited to) the manner in which
marginal utilities vary across survival states, the weights that
households attach to the well-being of each family member, degrees
of risk aversion, and load factors (more generally, the degree to
which the industry departs from actuarially fair pricing). 
Consequently, it is possible to rationalize a wide range of
behaviors.
Nevertheless, the absence of a significant correlation
between life insurance and financial vulnerabilities (measured by
benchmark life insurance)  would be difficult to reconcile with
theories of rational financial behavior.  Even if a household
places less weight on the well-being of a particular spouse, and
even if it must pay actuarially unfair rates, it should still
obtain greater insurance protection when the spouse in question is
exposed to more severe financial consequences.  To explain the
absence of a correlation, one would need to believe either that
our measure of benchmark life insurance is largely unrelated to
underlying vulnerabilities, or that  marginal utilities vary in a
way that just offsets the differences in measured vulnerabilities.
 Both possibilities  strike us as improbable.17
Evidence of widespread and substantial uninsured
vulnerabilities (as measured by actual IMPACT or by the divergence
of actual insurance from the benchmark) are also more difficult to
rationalize than it might at first appear.  Most potential
explanations presuppose that households deliberately choose
different living standards for survivors.  Yet this premise is
inconsistent with preliminary findings from a financial planning
case study at Boston University, involving nearly 500 subjects. 
Each of these individuals constructed a comprehensive financial
plan using the same financial planning software employed in the
current study.  Participants hoped to benefit from these sessions,
and therefore had strong incentives to provide accurate
information.  Though the software permits users to specify
different living standards for intact couples and each potential
survivor, the vast majority of subjects selected the same living
standard for each contingency.
12  While it is perfectly rational
for individuals to have other objectives, it is irrational for
individuals with these objectives to purchase coverage that
diverges significantly from our benchmark (assuming, of course,
that the benchmark is derived from a model that correctly depicts
all important aspects of the household’s opportunity set). 
3. Data
The 1995 wave of the SCF was fielded between June and
December 1995.  It surveyed over 4000 households, with
oversampling of the wealthy.
13  The data cover demographics,
                     
12Even with risk aversion, such choices are reasonable if load factors
are low.  For evidence on load factors in the context of life annuities, see
Mitchell, Poterba, Warshawsky, and Brown (1999). 
13 The SCF sampled 2,874 married couples and 1,425 single individuals.18
income, wealth, debt and credit, pensions, attitudes about
financial matters, the nature of various transactions with various
types of financial institutions, housing, real estate, businesses,
vehicles, health and life insurance, current and past employment,
current social security benefits, inheritances, charitable
contributions, education, and retirement plans.  The architects of
the SCF data files imputed missing information, supplying five
“implicates” for each household.
14  We use the first implicate.
Our final sample consists of 1,033 couples.  We excluded
couples for the following reasons: a) a spouse was self employed
or owned and actively managed a business (67 percent of excluded
observations); b) a spouse was temporarily unemployed (11
percent); c) neither spouse had regular earnings as an employee
(54 percent); d) labor earnings were defined in terms of a unit
other than time worked, for example by the piece (0.7 percent); e)
mortgage  information was inconsistent (7.4 percent); f) property
taxes were greater than 5 percent of the value of the home (2.6
percent); g) a spouse was over the age of 85 (1.6 percent); or h)
the couple’s reported income and other economic resources were
insufficient to support its reported fixed expenditures (3.3
percent).
15
                     
14 Kennickell (1991) provides a description of the imputation procedure.
15 Note that some households fall into more than one category.
Accurate measurement of life insurance coverage is, of
course, particularly critical for our analysis.  Fortunately, the19
SCF data match up reasonably well with other sources of
information concerning this variable.  In table 2, we make some
comparisons between statistics on life insurance coverage
(including all individual and group policies) drawn from the SCF
and from a survey fielded by the Life Insurance Marketing Research
Organization (LIMRA), an authoritative industry source. 
Generally, the figures are quite close.  Certainly, there is no
indication that the SCF understates life insurance coverage.  It
is, of course, possible that households underreported certain
forms of insurance (e.g. employer-provided policies) in both
surveys.  As an additional check on the validity of the data, we
computed the aggregate amount of in-force life insurance implied
by the SCF survey responses, and compared this with total in-force
life insurance reported by the industry (obtained from the
American Council on Life Insurance [1999]).  Since the latter
figure is derived directly from company records, it is presumably
reliable.  The SCF survey data accounts for roughly 81 percent of
aggregate in-force life insurance ($9.52 trillion out of $11.70
trillion).  Since some life insurance policies are owned by
companies,  trusts, and foreign individuals rather than by U.S.
households, the SCF figure appears to be in the right ballpark.
An important limitation of the SCF is that it contains
information only on the total amount of life insurance held by
each household, and not on the division of this insurance between
spouses.  Using data from the 1992 Health and Retirement Survey
(HRS), we estimated a regression equation explaining the fraction
of a couple’s total life insurance held on the life of the husband
as a function of the age of each spouse, the husband’s earnings,20
the husbands share of the couple’s total non-asset income, family
size, and the husband’s share of the couple’s total benchmark life
insurance.  We then used this regression to impute the fraction of
total insurance held on the life of each spouse for every couple
in the 1995 SCF.  Because we do not wish to rely on these
imputations more than is necessary, much of our analysis concerns
household aggregates.  This approach is somewhat different from
that of Bernheim et al. [2001], who treated an individual spouse
as the unit of analysis throughout.
4. Results
Table 3 provides a variety of summary statistics, including
some simple information on insurance coverage.  According to
figures in panel A, the average benchmark level of life insurance
for a household exceeded actual life insurance holdings by a wide
margin (more than two-to-one for the mean, and nearly three-to-one
for the median).  Panel B indicates that the average level of
insurance actually held on the lives of husbands and primary
earners diverged sharply from the average benchmark, whereas the
average level of insurance actually held on the lives of wives and
secondary earners was quite close to the average benchmark.
16  This
implies that, on average, wives and secondary earners faced
substantial uninsured vulnerabilities, whereas husbands and
primary earners did not.
In the second-to-last line of panel B (¢ liv. std., ignore
ins.), we tabulate means and medians for IMPACT calculated as if
each household held no life insurance.  This variable measures
                     
16It is important to bear in mind that we have imputed the shares of a
household’s insurance held on the lives of each spouse, as described in
section 3.21
underlying financial exposure.  Without insurance, the average
living standards for surviving husbands, wives, primary earners,
and secondary earners would have been, respectively, 5.7 percent,
28.6 percent, 3.8 percent, and 30.5 percent below their benchmark
levels.  Since the corresponding medians for husbands and primary
earners are zero, we can infer that more than half of these
individuals were not at-risk of a reduction in sustainable living
standard.  Likewise, since the corresponding median living
standard reductions for wives and secondary earners were 21.5
percent and 24.6 percent, respectively, we conclude that more than
have of these individuals confronted significant underlying
vulnerabilities.
In the final line of panel B (¢ liv. std., actual), we
tabulate means and medians for IMPACT based on actual insurance
holdings.  This variable measures uninsured financial exposure. 
Life insurance reduced the mean value of IMPACT by roughly 40
percent for wives and secondary earners.  The decline in the
median value of IMPACT for secondary earners is a bit larger,
while the proportional decline in median IMPACT for wives is
closer to two-thirds.  For husbands and primary earners, life
insurance had a relatively minor absolute effect on mean and
median IMPACT, but the average underlying vulnerabilities were
small for these groups to begin with.
Based on these initial findings, one might be inclined to
conclude that, on average, life insurance addresses between 40
percent and 50 percent of the underlying exposure for the most
vulnerable spouse.  However, this conclusion is premature. 
Underlying financial exposures vary dramatically across22
households.  From an inspection of averages (table 3), one cannot
determine whether the distribution of insurance holdings matches
up with the distribution of exposures.  As we will see, the
averages mask a startling mismatch between vulnerabilities and
insurance holdings.  Moreover, simple averages also fail to reveal
substantial uninsured vulnerabilities for sizable minorities of
husbands and primary workers.
Table 4 provides a first glimpse at the relation between
benchmark insurance and actual insurance across households.  In
panel A, we group households into four categories based on the
benchmark insurance level.  As indicated in the second column,
similar fractions of the data sample fall into each of these
groups.  The figures in the third column suggest that there is
practically no relationship between benchmark insurance and the
likelihood of holding insurance.  In this sense, the decision to
obtain insurance appears to be uncorrelated with underlying
vulnerabilities.  The fourth and fifth columns permit comparisons
between the medians of benchmark insurance and actual insurance
for each of the four groups.  There is perhaps a small correlation
across groups between insurance purchases and the benchmark.  A
similar conclusion follows from a comparison of means (columns 6
and 7), though the average level of actual insurance for those
with no underlying vulnerabilities (benchmark insurance of zero)
is anomalously large.
Though there is some indication that benchmark insurance is
mildly correlated with actual insurance, the proper interpretation
of this correlation is unclear.  From panel A, it is apparent that
differences in the median and mean levels of actual insurance23
across groups correspond reasonably closely to differences in
median household income (second-to-last column).  Consider the
alternative hypothesis that households with more income
mechanically acquire more insurance without much deliberate
consideration of vulnerabilities and needs.  It is reasonable to
entertain this possibility because many employers automatically
provide life insurance equal to some multiple of salary, and
because life insurance agents frequently base recommendations on
simple rules of thumb involving multiples of earnings.  This
hypothesis would account for the positive correlation between
benchmark and actual insurance levels among those for whom the
benchmark is positive.  Moreover, it would explain the otherwise
anomalously high levels of insurance holdings among those for who
benchmark insurance is zero (and who also tend to have higher
incomes).
Panel B of table 4 contains the same information as panel A,
except that insurance levels are expressed as ratios to household
earnings.  This serves as a rough control for earnings, and
permits us to evaluate the extent of the relationship between
benchmark and actual levels of insurance that exists independently
of the mechanical “income effect” hypothesized in the preceding
paragraph.  Once again, we divide the sample into four groups of
roughly equal sizes (as indicated in the second column).  Though
the percent insured rises slightly with the ratio of benchmark
insurance to earnings across the first three groups, it is lowest
for the most vulnerable group (those with ratios of benchmark
insurance to earnings in excess of 8).  Moreover, regardless of
whether one looks at medians (columns 4 and 5) or means (columns 624
and 7), the correlation across groups between the ratio of
benchmark insurance to earnings and the ratio of actual insurance
to earnings is weak at best.  These observations suggests that the
small correlation between benchmark and actual insurance levels
noted in our discussion of panel A results from an income effect,
and not from deliberate evaluation of other factors affecting
vulnerabilities. 
Table 5 summarizes the relationship between benchmark and
actual levels of life insurance through some simple univariate
regression models.  Panel A presents results based on levels of
life insurance, while panel B examines ratios of life insurance to
earnings.  In each panel, we estimate the equation of interest
using three different methods: OLS, Tobit (to check for potential
biases arising from the sizeable fraction of households who hold
no insurance), and median regression (to check for sensitivity to
outliers).  In addition, we also estimate a Probit model
explaining the likelihood that a household’s actual insurance
holdings are strictly positive. 
In panel A, we find that a one-dollar increase in the
benchmark tends to coincide with a 22 cent increase in actual
insurance holdings.  For each of the three methods employed, we
estimate this coefficient with considerable precision.  Households
with higher levels of benchmark insurance are also more likely to
hold strictly positive insurance, but the difference is not
statistically significant.  In panel B, we find that the
correlations noted in panel A result almost entirely from
systematic differences in income.  The ratio of benchmark
insurance to earnings is almost completely unrelated to the ratio25
of actual insurance to earnings, and is in fact negatively related
to the likelihood of holding insurance.
The logic of examining simple univariate regressions is that
benchmark insurance functions as a sufficient statistic for the
full range of factors – ages of spouses, number of children,
division of earnings between spouses, and so forth – that
determine underlying vulnerabilities.  Certainly, it would not be
sensible to control for all of the factors affecting
vulnerabilities, as this would leave no residual variation in
benchmark insurance from which to identify the covariation with
actual insurance.
There are, however, valid reasons to investigate the
correlation between benchmark and actual levels of insurance
conditional upon a subset of the factors that determine
vulnerabilities.  As mentioned at the outset of this paper,
Bernheim, et al. [2001] previously documented the absence of a
correlation between insurance holdings and vulnerabilities among
older workers.  One of our primary objectives is to distinguish
between two alternative explanations for this pattern: that
insurance purchases are largely uncorrelated with vulnerabilities,
or that households purchase long-term policies based on
vulnerabilities relatively early in life, but subsequently fail to
adjust coverage appropriately because of  inertia and/or other
psychological considerations.  To accomplish this objective, we
must study the relationship between life insurance and underlying
vulnerabilities conditional on age.
The final column of panels A and B in table 4 provide a
separate reason to control for age.  Note that both the absolute26
value of benchmark insurance and the ratio of the benchmark to
household earnings decline sharply with the couple’s average age
(defined as the average of the husband’s and wife’s ages).  This
stands to reason, since younger individuals generally have more
future human capital to protect.  Now consider the following two-
part hypothesis: (1) young individuals tend to procrastinate with
respect to decisions concerning life insurance, and (2) when they
finally obtain insurance, the amount purchased is closely related
to vulnerabilities.  Since younger households have greater
vulnerabilities, the first portion of the hypothesis would tend to
create a negative correlation between insurance holdings and
underlying vulnerabilities.  In principle, this could obscure the
positive correlation implied by the second portion of the
hypothesis.
Table 6 contains various regressions in which we control for
the effects of age.  In each case, the
dependent variable is the ratio of actual life insurance to
household earnings.
17  There are two separate sets of results.  For
the first four regressions, we include linear and quadratic terms
in the couple’s average age (defined as above), as well as an
interaction term between age and the ratio of benchmark life
insurance to household earnings.  The interaction term permits us
to investigate the hypothesis that the correlation between
insurance holdings and vulnerabilities changes with age.  If
households initially purchase appropriate levels of insurance but
                     
17Scaling the insurance variables by earnings is, of course, a perfect
control for earnings only if the earnings elasticity of insurance purchases is
unity.  When an earnings variable (either levels or logs) is added to the list
of explanatory variables for any specification in table 5, the results
described below change relatively little.27
subsequently fail to adjust their holdings as circumstances
change, we would expect to obtain a positive coefficient for the
benchmark insurance term, and a negative coefficient for the
interaction term.  For the last four regressions in table 6, we
adopt a more flexible functional specification.  In particular, we
divide the population into five age groups, and control both for
age-group dummies and for interactions between these dummies and
the benchmark-insurance-to-earnings ratio.  This is equivalent to
estimating a separate univariate regression for each age group. 
At the bottom of the table, we report test statistics for two
hypotheses.  The first is that there is no relationship between
actual insurance and benchmark insurance at any age.  The second
is that the relationship between actual insurance and benchmark
insurance does not change systematically with age.
In the first three specifications of table 6, the coefficient
of the benchmark-insurance-to-earnings ratio is small, slightly
negative, and statistically insignificant, while the insurance-age
interaction term is indistinguishable from zero.  This implies
that there is essentially no relationship between actual insurance
and benchmark insurance at any age.  The test statistics at the
bottom of the table confirm this impression.  For the fourth
specification (a probit model), the coefficient of the benchmark-
insurance-to-earnings ratio is negative and marginally
significant, while the coefficient of the interaction term is
positive but insignificant.  One rejects the hypothesis that
vulnerabilities (as measured by benchmark insurance) have no
effect on the likelihood of holding insurance at any age, but the
direction of the effect is counterintuitive: the probit28
coefficients imply that the likelihood of holding insurance is
negatively correlated with benchmark insurance for households
under 100 years of age.
Regression results based on a more flexible functional
specification tell a similar story.  The age-specific benchmark
insurance coefficients are generally small, frequently negative,
and almost always insignificant.  For the OLS and Tobit
specifications, one cannot reject the joint hypothesis that there
is no significant correlation between benchmark insurance and
actual insurance at any age.  In every specification, we fail to
reject the hypothesis that this correlation does not vary
significantly with age.
Table 7 provides further information on the distributions of
the IMPACT variables.  Recall that the measurement of actual
IMPACT requires us to impute the share of household insurance held
on the life of each spouse.  As discussed previously, ignoring
insurance, IMPACT is never strictly greater than zero.  This
reflects the fact that we have imposed a non-negativity constraint
on life insurance purchases.  An individual’s living standard may
rise upon a spouse’s death; however, without life insurance, it
cannot exceed the living standard that the he or she would enjoy
as a survivor assuming implementation of the (constrained)
benchmark financial plan.  Note also that actual IMPACT is exactly
equal to zero for a substantial fraction of the population. 
Generally, these are individuals for whom actual and (model-
generated) benchmark levels of insurance protection are both zero.
From table 7, it is once again evident that insurance
holdings match up rather poorly with financial vulnerabilities. 29
Overall, 36.8 percent of wives, 64.1 percent of husbands, 32.0
percent of secondary earners, and 68.8 percent of primary earners
had strictly positive life insurance protection despite the fact
that they would have experienced increases in living standards
upon the deaths of their spouses (in Table 7, those with actual
IMPACT greater than zero).  Insurance reduced the fraction of
individuals at-risk of severe financial consequences (defined as a
decline in living standard of 40 percent or greater) from 31.0
percent to 19.3 percent for wives, from 32.5 percent to 20.6
percent of secondary earners, from 3.5 percent to 2.9 percent of
husbands, and from 1.9 percent to 1.6 percent for primary earners.
 Similarly, insurance reduced the fraction of individuals at-risk
of significant financial consequences (defined as a decline in
living standard of 20 percent or greater) from 51.9 percent to
37.9 percent for wives, from 55.9 percent to 41.7 percent for
secondary earners, from 10.0 percent to 8.5 percent for husbands,
and from 6.0 percent to 4.7 percent for primary earners.  Roughly
speaking, only 15 to 25 percent of households with significant
financial exposures held sufficient life insurance to avert
significant consequences for survivors. 
Table 8 provides further information on the extent to which
insurance mitigates financial vulnerabilities.  We subdivide the
population based on underlying financial exposure, measured by the
value of IMPACT, ignoring insurance.  For each subgroup, we then
calculate the means of both IMPACT variables, as well as the
percentage of households holding no life insurance, and averages
for benchmark and actual insurance.
We draw three conclusions from table 8.  First, life30
insurance had, at best, a moderate impact on financial exposures
among the at-risk population.  For example, among severely at-risk
wives, insurance reduced the average consequences of a spouse’s
death (mean IMPACT) by only 27 percent (17.9 percentage points),
from -65.5 percent to -47.6 percent.  This is a far cry from the
one-half overall reduction in mean IMPACT for wives noted in table
3.  For this same group, households would have needed to hold an
average of $630,079 in total life insurance to assure both the
husband and wife of an undiminished living standard.  In fact, on
average, they held only one-quarter of this amount ($166,628). 
This implies an even larger discrepancy (more than $460,000) than
the overall difference (just under $240,000) noted in table 3.
Second, for a fixed level of financial exposure, households
were more inclined to protect women than men.  For example, among
severely at-risk husbands, insurance reduced the average
consequences of the wife’s death (mean IMPACT) by only 6 percent
(4.3 percentage points), from -68.4 percent to -64.1 percent. 
This contrasts sharply with the corresponding figures for wives,
noted above.  One might question the reliability of this finding
on the grounds that we have imputed the division of insurance
between spouses based on patterns in the HRS.  However, the gender
difference is plainly not an artifact of the imputation procedure.
 Note in particular that couples with severely at-risk wives on
average held in total $166,628 of life insurance, while couples
with severely at-risk husbands on average held only 15 percent of
this amount ($24,827).
Third, the likelihood of holding insurance bears little if
any relation to underlying vulnerabilities, as measured by IMPACT31
(ignoring insurance).  Indeed, the fraction of couples without
life insurance is generally largest for those with severe
financial exposures (IMPACT ignoring insurance less than -40
percent).
Table 9 provides disaggregated results for various population
subgroups.  To conserve space, we confine our attention to primary
and secondary earners (results for husbands and wives are
similar).  In addition to reporting the percentage of each
subgroup with severe and significant exposures based on IMPACT
with actual insurance (Freq. Actual) and on IMPACT ignoring
insurance (Freq. Ins=0), we also report the fractional reduction
in each exposure rate resulting from insurance coverage (Frac.
Addr.).
18 
                     
18Formally, frac. addr. (fraction addressed) = [(Freq. Ins=0) - (Freq.
Actual)]/(Freq. Ins=0).
Significant and severe uninsured financial vulnerabilities
were more common among low income households, couples with
disparate earnings, relatively young households, couples with
dependent children, and non-whites.  Thus, factors that are highly
correlated with underlying vulnerabilities (particularly earnings
disparaties, age, and children) are also highly correlated with
uninsured vulnerabilities.  This finding is, of course, implied by
the poor correlation between vulnerabilities and insurance
holdings. 
According to table 9, conditional upon the existence of a
significant or severe vulnerability, households with lower
incomes, greater income disparities between spouses, no children,32
and non-whites are less likely to moderate the financial
consequences of a spouse’s death through life insurance (see the
column labeled “frac. addr.”).  The relationship between age and
the conditional likelihood of addressing a significant or severe
vulnerability was hump-shaped, with a peak in the 40-55 year age
range.  Households were generally less likely to address
vulnerabilities for primary earners.  Note that a low proclivity
to address exposures can coincide either with high (as in the case
of lower income households) or low (as in the case of older
individuals and primary earners) levels of underlying
vulnerability.
When one compares households of similar ages, our results are
quite close to those derived from the HRS data in Bernheim et al.
[2001].
19  For example, we find that 13.4 percent of secondary
earners between the ages of 56 and 70 have significant uninsured
vulnerabilities while 7.6 percent have severe uninsured
vulnerabilities; the comparable figures in Bernheim et al. [2001]
for 60 to 69 year old survivors are 14.1 percent and 8.9 percent.
 Moreover, the data exhibit the same qualitative patterns with
respect to the magnitudes of vulnerabilities, as well as with
respect to the propensity to address vulnerabilities, across
                     
19The age-adjusted frequencies of severe and significant uninsured
financial exposures reported here and in Bernheim, et al. [2001] are lower
than Auerbach and Kotlikoff’s [1987, 1991a, 1991b] estimates.  Possible
explanations for the disparity include increases in female labor force
participation since the 1960s, changes in patterns of insurance coverage, and
methodological differences.33
household categories. 
It is, however, important to reiterate that data limitations
precluded previous studies from shedding light on the insurance
holdings of younger households.  Consequently, our findings
concerning age are particularly noteworthy.  According to table 9,
nearly two-thirds of secondary earners between the ages of 22 and
39 have significant financial vulnerabilities (projected
reductions in living standards exceeding 20 percent), and nearly
one-third have severe vulnerabilities (projected reductions
exceeding 40 percent).  Moreover, for this age group, only one in
five households with at-risk secondary earners (those who would
experience significant or severe declines in living standard upon
the death of their spouse, ignoring insurance) held sufficient
life insurance to avert significant or severe financial
consequences. 
Thus far, we have measured the consequences of a spouse’s
death in terms of the proportional change in sustainable living
standard.  For many individuals, the potential financial
consequences of a spouse’s death are also severe in absolute
terms.  With maximal consumption smoothing (benchmark insurance),
 sustainable consumption for 3.58 percent of surviving wives and
2.61 percent of surviving husbands would fall below the 1995
poverty thresholds published by the U.S. Census Bureau.  Taking
into account actual levels of insurance coverage, poverty rates
would have been 10.45 percent among surviving wives and 4.16
percent among surviving husbands.  These findings imply that 66
percent (6.87 of 10.45 percentage points) of poverty among
surviving women and 37 percent (1.55 out of 4.16 percentage34
points) of poverty among surviving men resulted from a failure to
ensure survivors of an undiminished living standard through
insurance.  Ignoring insurance, poverty rates would have been
13.17 percent among surviving wives and 4.26 percent among
surviving husbands.  Consequently, insurance eliminated only 28
percent of the avoidable poverty among surviving widows (2.72 out
of 9.59 percentage points), and only 6 percent of the avoidable
poverty among surviving men (0.1 out of 1.63 percentage points).
5. Robustness
In table 10, we examine the extent to which our estimated
frequencies of significant and severe uninsured vulnerabilities
are sensitive to changes in key assumptions and parameters.  To
conserve space, we focus on primary and secondary earners.  For
purposes of comparison, we reproduce our base-case results in the
first line of the table.
Changes in the real interest rate, baseline wage growth rate,
and maximum lifespan alter the results relatively little.
20  In
each case, this reflects the opposing effects of offsetting
forces.  With higher interest rates, a given level of life
insurance coverage generates higher real income.  However, since
survivors are typically more dependent on long-duration life
annuities than intact couples, the present discounted value of
their resources tends to decline by a larger proportion when the
rate of return rises.  For older workers, the rate of wage growth
is relatively unimportant because it affects comparatively few
years of earnings.  Moreover, while a given rate of growth
                     
20For our base case, we assume that the inflation rate and real interest
rate are both 3 percent.35
produces a larger absolute increase in earnings for primary
earners, secondary earners tend to be younger, and therefore
benefit from higher growth over a longer time frame.  A reduction
in maximum lifespan reduces the resources that a survivor needs to
achieve a given living standard, but increases the living standard
that the intact couple can achieve from available resources. 
The consumption growth rate refers to steepness of the
sustainable living standard trajectory.  For our base-case, we
compute the highest living standard that is sustainable throughout
life in all contingencies; this corresponds to a consumption
growth rate of zero.  For sufficiently patient (impatient)
households, it may be more natural to construct benchmarks based
on a rising (falling) living standard trajectory.  The
proportional effects of a change in the consumption growth rate on
the resource needs of survivors and intact couples are
approximately equal.  Our results are therefore robust with
respect to changes in this parameter.
The frequencies of exposure to significant and severe
financial consequences are noticeably lower in the absence of
household scale economies (an extreme and somewhat implausible
assumption).  It is somewhat higher when we reduce the rate of
pension survivor benefits from 100 percent to 50 percent, but the
change is much smaller than that reported in Bernheim et al.
[2001].  The discrepancy is presumably attributable to differences
between the age distributions of the SCF and HRS samples.  For
younger households, pension survivor benefits make less of a
difference both because they are further in the future and thus
more heavily discounted, and because younger workers have not yet36
accumulated substantial pension entitlements.
As mentioned previously, our base case assumptions concerning
housing are consistent with empirical evidence indicating that
individuals avoid changing residences (increasingly so as they
age), and that they resist using housing equity to finance
ordinary living expenses.  However, since some widows do move, we
examine sensitivity to two alternative assumptions.  For the
first, we adopt the extreme position that housing consumption is
completely and continuously flexible, and that housing equity is a
perfect substitute for other forms of wealth.  For the second
alternative, we adopt an intermediate position: a survivor
downsizes the couple’s primary residence by 30 percent, but
thereafter avoids using housing equity to finance ordinary living
expenses.
21  Though the first alternative dramatically reduces the
estimated frequencies of individuals at risk of severe or
significant financial consequences, the effect of the second (and,
we think, more plausible) alternative is relatively small.
As in Bernheim, et al. [2001], our base case calculations
assume that survivors do not alter their labor force
participation.  Since non-working wives approaching retirement age
have limited employment options subsequent to their husbands’
deaths, this assumption was appropriate for the HRS sample.  It is
somewhat more problematic for the younger households that are
included in the SCF.  Conceivably, some couples may hold
                     
21In this exercise, we assume that the financing for the new house is
the same as the continuation financing for the old house.  Consequently, upon
a spouse’s death, the decline in home equity equals the reduction in the value
of the home, and there is an offsetting increase in non-housing assets;
mortgage payments are unchanged, but other housing expenses fall by 30
percent.37
apparently low levels of insurance on a primary earner because, in
the event of his or her death, they expect the surviving spouse to
find full-time employment.  We note, however, that this
explanation is inconsistent with a finding reported in section 4:
fixing the level of underlying vulnerability, couples are less
likely to obtain insurance for the protection of primary earners
(and husbands) than for secondary earners (and wives).  Since
primary earners are already (in most cases) fully employed,
secondary earners have greater latitude to increase labor force
participation.  Consequently, for a given level of vulnerability,
one would expect to observe greater protection of primary earners,
which is not the case.
To evaluate the sensitivity of our results with respect to
possible changes in labor force participation, we consider an
extreme alternative assumption: all survivors, whether out of the
labor force or employed part-time, return to full-time employment.
 We impute full-time earnings based on regressions of earnings on
demographic characteristics, estimated separately for fully
employed men and women.  A survivor’s contingent earnings are set
equal to the maximum of imputed earnings and actual earnings.  Due
to familiar sample selection problems, this procedure tends to
overstate potential earnings for non-workers; it therefore
understates survivors’ financial vulnerabilities.  As indicated in
table 10, the estimated frequencies of financial vulnerability are
reasonably sensitive to this alternative assumption. This
contrasts with the findings of Bernheim et al. [2001].  The
difference is not particularly surprising, since the ability to
alter labor supply is more important for younger workers.  Note,38
however, that substantial uninsured vulnerabilities are reasonably
widespread even with this extreme alternative assumption.  This
too is not surprising, given the high levels of vulnerabilities
among dual earner households noted in table 9.
In principle, shifts in non-labor income might also cushion
the financial impact of a spouse’s death.  Our analysis makes no
allowance for this possibility.  Presumably, the most important
source of potential support is assistance from relatives. 
Bernheim, et al. [2001] report that, between the first two waves
of the HRS, only 6.2 percent of new widows received any assistance
of this type.  Between the second and third waves, the figure was
7.5 percent; and between the third and fourth waves, it was only
2.5 percent.  In addition, support may have been modest and/or
temporary in many of these cases.  Consequently, there is little
evidence that external support payments are significant in
practice. Although the HRS only provides information on older
widows, we conjecture that these figures are lower for young
widows (except perhaps where young children are present).
As emphasized in section 3, the SCF collects information only
on total life insurance for each household, and not on the
proportions attributable to each spouse.  Our base case results
apportion this insurance using the imputation method described
previously.  If in some cases these imputations falsely imply that
insurance is held to protect spouses who are not financially
vulnerable, then our calculations will overstate uninsured
vulnerabilities for at-risk individuals.  To examine the potential
significance of imputation error, we consider an extreme
alternative assumption: all life insurance is held to protect the39
secondary earner (who is, in general, considerably more
vulnerable).  As indicated in table 9, the effects on our results
are minimal.  This is not surprising for two reasons: total
household life insurance is typically small relative to benchmark
insurance, and, in any case, our imputations attribute most life
insurance to the primary earner.
If important economic variables are measured with error, our
calculations may overstate the thickness of the upper and lower
tails of the distribution of IMPACT, thereby exaggerating the
frequencies of significant and severe financial vulnerabilities. 
Measures of household assets tend to be particularly noisy. 
However, as illustrated in the final two rows of table 10, our
findings are not sensitive to moderate changes in the values of
wealth (a 20 percent increase or decrease).
As mentioned in section 2, we have ignored the possibility
that remarriage might cushion the impact of a spouse’s death. 
Bernheim, et al. [2001] report that remarriage occurs with low
frequency among the HRS sample, but it is probably more common for
the younger households included in the SCF.  Since it is difficult
to model the consequences of remarriage, we did not conduct
pertinent sensitivity analysis.  Consequently, we cannot rule out
the possibility that low levels of insurance among young
households are attributable to the expectation that a survivor
will benefit financially from remarriage.  However, this
hypothesis strikes us as odd.  Even young individuals must
consider the risk that they may be unable or unwilling to remarry,
the value of retaining the option not to remarry, and the effect
of financial status on remarriage prospects.40
Although the estimated fractions of individuals with
significant and severe uninsured financial vulnerabilities are
sensitive to certain critical assumptions, it is important to
emphasize that the poor correlation between coverage and
vulnerability is robust.  From table 10, we see that the change in
the estimated incidence of vulnerability is largest when we assume
either that there are no economies of shared living, that housing
expenditures are completely flexible, or that all survivors work
full time.  However, for all of these alternative scenarios,
regressions analogous to those reported in section 4 continue to
indicate that households with greater vulnerabilities (measured by
benchmark insurance) typically have no more coverage on average,
at any age, than those with greater vulnerabilities.
6. Conclusions
Using the 1995 Survey of Consumer Finances and an elaborate
life-cycle model, we have quantified the potential financial
impact of each individual’s death on his or her survivors, and we
have measured the degree to which life insurance moderates these
consequences.  We have found that life insurance is essentially
uncorrelated with financial vulnerability at every stage of the
life cycle.  This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that
life insurance bears little relation to needs at the time of
purchase; however, it tends to refute the hypothesis that
households purchase long-term contracts with initially appropriate
insurance coverage, but fail to adjust this coverage through time
as their circumstances change. 
The impact of insurance among at-risk households is modest,
and substantial uninsured vulnerabilities are widespread,41
particularly among younger couples.  Nearly two-thirds of
secondary earners between the ages of 22 and 39 have significant
financial vulnerabilities (projected reductions in living
standards exceeding 20 percent), and nearly one-third have severe
vulnerabilities (projected reductions exceeding 40 percent). 
Moreover, only one in five of these at-risk households held
sufficient life insurance to avert significant or severe financial
consequences.  Combining all age groups, 56 percent of secondary
earners and 6 percent of primary earners would have experienced
significant or severe declines in living standard upon the death
of a spouse in the absence of life insurance.  Actual life
insurance holdings reduce these figures to, respectively, 42
percent and 5 percent.  Thus, the overall impact of life insurance
holdings on financial vulnerabilities among at-risk households is
modest.  Roughly two-thirds of poverty among surviving women and
more than one-third of poverty among surviving men results from a
failure to ensure survivors of an undiminished living standard
through insurance. 
We have also provided evidence of a significant gender bias
in life insurance holdings.  Specifically, for any given level of
financial vulnerabilities, couples provide significantly more
protection for wives than for husbands.  For example, couples with
severely at-risk wives on average hold $166,628 of life insurance,
while couples with severely at-risk husbands on average hold only
15 percent of this amount ($24,827).42





Base case 285,922 0
+ Age (50,48) 127,455 0













+ Child (age 9) 298,016 0









+ Real interest rate
(5%)
210,364 0
- Real interest rate
(1%)
409,454 0
Note: Assumptions for base case: age of husband: 40, age of wife:
38, husband’s employee earnings: $45,000, wife’s employee
earnings: $25,000, husband’s retirement age: 64, wife’s retirement
age: 63, number of children: 2, age of children: 5 & 7, non-
housing net wealth: $50,000, primary home value: $150,000,
mortgage balance: $120,000, earnings growth: 1%, real interest
rate: 3%.43
Table 2   Validation of the SCF life insurance data
Percent covered (all life
insurance)
Mean coverage (all life
insurance)
LIMRA SCF LIMRA SCF
All
households
78% 85% 132,304 163,973
Ages 18-24 47% 51% 92,222 96,438
Ages 25-34 75% 80% 149,476 159,916
Ages 35-44 85% 87% 202,150 203,759
Ages 45-54 83% 92% 159,569 200,058
Ages 55-64 83% 86% 96,567 105,441
65 and
older
77% 87% 27,156 39,692
Note: Life Insurance Marketing Research Association (LIMRA)
figures are based on a 1992 survey (see American Council of Life
Insurance [1994]), with mean coverage adjusted to 1995 dollars.44
Table 3    Descriptive statistics













Insurance, actual 206,022 71,000
Total Household Life
Insurance, benchmark 443,444 205,058
Number of children 0.97 1
Panel B: Individual level variables









Age 44 43 42 41 43 43 42 41
Non white 0.172 0
Gender 0011 0.220 0 0.780 1
College
degree
0.404 0 0.375 0 0.422 0 0.356 0
Pension
coverage


































































% Note: Imputed and benchmark life insurance refer to insurance on
the life of the individual listed at the top of the column. 
Changes in living standard (¢ liv. std.) for the spouse listed at
the top of each column depend on insurance on the life of the other spouse.45
other spouse.46
Table 4    Characteristics of households with different levels of benchmark insurance





































21.2% 83.1% 0 68,000 0 215,174 65,000 56
$1-
$199,999
28.4% 81.2% 97,972 39,000 99,073 106,499 35,360 46
$200,000-
$449,999
25.8% 82.8% 309,668 100,000 313,821 174,565 50,000 38
$450,000
or more
24.6% 83.5% 674,480 100,000 1,359,28
6
346,001 62,220 31
























































0 21.2% 83.1% 0 0.96 0 2.53 65,000 56
0 to 3.99 26.8% 87.0% 2.07 1.37 2.08 2.09 54.000 47
4 to 7.99 24.9% 89.9% 5.59 1.91 5.69 2.84 54,789 3947
8 or more 27.1% 71.1% 12.57 1.09 15.03 2.86 37,901 3048
Table 5    Regression results, actual life insurance versus
benchmark life insurance







































Note: Standard errors are given in parentheses.49
Table 6    Additional regression results, actual life insurance vs. benchmark life insurance
OLS Tobit Median
Reg.





-0.0485 -0.1923 -0.0524  -0.0102 
(0.1057) (0.1355) (0.0337) (0.0059)
average age of couple 0.0540 0.1374 0.0854  0.0195  
(0.1390) (0.1701) (0.0507) (0.0077)
average age of couple
squared
-0.0012 -0.0023 -0.0012 -0.0002  




-0.0009 0.0034 0.0009 0.0001
(0.0034) (0.0042) (0.0012) (0.0002)
Age<22 (group 1) 0.15054 -1.7201 0.00 0.1367
(3.8696) (5.1116) (1.7100) (0.2005)
Age 22-40 (group 2) 3.4352 3.1355 2.2503 0.2959
(0.5222) (0.6250) (0.2103) (0.0295)
Age 41-55 (group 3) 2.2872 1.8239 1.5278 0.3293
(0.4705) (0.5415) (0.2209) (0.0305)
Age 56-70 (group 4) 1.6729 0.7231 0.6167 0.2340
(0.5756) (0.6674) (0.1167) (0.0330)
Age 71+(group 5) 0.7924 -1.2351 .2759 0.1109





0.0458 -0.0405 0.00 -0.0077





-0.0306 -0.1098 -0.0556 -0.0091





0.0738 0.0400 0.0362 -.0083





-0.0066 -0.0052 0.0348 0.0003





-0.0368 0.2251 0.0750 0.0389
(0.7363) (0.8592) (0.1057) (0.0443)




actual and benchmark at
any age
0.840 0.184 0.123 0.009 0.958 0.435 0.002 0.001
The relationship
between actual and
benchmark is the same
at all ages
0.793 0.420 0.456 0.598 0.925 0.864 0.287 0.794
Note: Standard errors are given in parentheses.51
Table 7    Distribution of Changes in Living Standard for
Surviving Spouses














-40% to -20% 20.91% 18.68% 6.49% 5.61%
-20% to 0% 19.36% 19.94% 17.42% 15.10%
0% 28.75% 5.32% 72.60% 12.29%
0% to +20% - 31.85% - 63.12%
+20% to +40% - 3.39% - 0.68%
>+40% - 1.55% - 0.29%
Observations 1033 1033 1033 1033
Panel B: Primary and Secondary Earners
Surviving spouses are:









<-40% 32.53% 20.62% 1.94% 1.55%
-40% to -20% 23.33% 21.10% 4.07% 3.19%
-20% to 0% 20.52% 22.17% 16.26% 12.88%
0% 23.62% 4.07% 77.73% 13.55%
0% to +20% - 27.49% - 67.47%
+20% to +40% - 3.00% - 1.06%
>+40% - 1.55% - 0.29%
Observations 1033 1033 1033 103352



















Wives <-40% -65.5% -47.6% 22.8% 630,079 166,628
-40% to -20% -30.1% -17.2% 14.8% 908.146 265,210
0% to -20% -10.3% 1.68% 10.5% 107,633 133,122
0% 0.0% 6.14% 18.2% 0 116,059
Husbands <-40% -68.4% -64.1% 22.2% 291,568 24,827
-40% to -20% -27.1% -23.4% 22.4% 210,961 23,056
0% to -20% -8.7% -4.4% 18.3% 78,528 37,625
0% 0.0% 2.9% 16.7% 0 42,545
Secondary <-40% -65.8% -49.1% 22.3% 614,989 159,234
 earners -40% to -20% -29.8% -18.2% 14.9% 830,155 236,420
0% to -20% -10.3% -0.3% 13.2% 104,850 116,975
0% 0.0% 6.9% 16.8% 0 125,237
Primary <-40% -66.4% -53.2% 30.0% 274,272 35,598
 earners -40% to -20% -26.8% -21.5% 26.2% 243,488 44,115
0% to -20% -8.6% -3.1% 15.5% 79,962 51,181
0% 0.0% 2.9% 17.2% 0 44,60953
Table 9: Frequency of Severe and Significant Financial Consequences for Surviving Spouses:
Selected Population Subgroups

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 10: Frequency of Severe and Significant Financial Consequences for Surviving Spouses:
Robustness (Full Sample, Imputed Insurance)
Consequences for Secondary
Earners









Base case 20.6% 41.7% 1.55% 4.74%
Real interest rate = 1% 23.9% 44.2% 1.92% 5.19%
Real interest rate = 5% 19.3% 38.5% 1.35% 4.15%
Baseline wage growth
rate = 0%
19.8% 40.0% 1.65% 4.55%
Baseline wage growth
rate = 2%
22.6% 42.9% 1.45% 5.14%
Maximum lifespan = 85 20.5% 41.2% 1.45% 4.66%
Consumption growth rate
= 1%
20.2% 39.9% 1.45% 4.17%
Consumption growth rate
= -1%
21.1% 42.5% 1.55% 5.02%
No ecs. of shared
living (·=1)
14.7% 26.2% 0.77% 1.84%
Survivor receives 50%
pens. bens.
22.3% 45.3% 1.65% 4.84%
Housing completely
fungible
10.8% 28.3% 0.38% 2.00%
Survivor downsizes
house by 30%
18.5% 36.9% 1.16% 4.07%
Survivors fully
employed
11.5% 29.6% 1.45% 4.65%
All life insurance
assigned to the primary
earner
19.9% 38.8% 1.94% 6.00%56
Wealth reduced by 20% 21.3% 43.1% 1.54% 4.73%
Wealth increased by 20% 20.2% 40.9% 1.45% 4.45%57
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Non-Asset Income.  Our calculations  require data on each spouse’s
past and future covered earnings as well as future total (covered
and uncovered) earnings.  We assume that all earnings are covered.
 For respondents who were working at the survey date, we have 1995
self-reported labor earnings.  In order to impute past and future
earnings we use a model that assumes that the cross section age-
earnings profile for fully employed workers remains constant
through time.  We allow real wages for all ages to grow over time,
using the historic Social Security real wage growth for past
years, and a 1 percent overall real wage growth factor for future
years.  (In our robustness analysis, was also look at a 0 percent
and 2 percent overal real wage growth factor for future years.)  
In estimating past earnings we assume that the first year of
employment is the maximum of 1951 and the year the person was 22.
22
 Households where one of the spouses was temporarily not working,
as opposed to out of the labor force, were dropped from our
sample.
The SCF provides information on other kinds of non-asset income. 
We treat some of these income sources, such as Veteran’s Benefits,
SSI, disability income, welfare, child support, and regular help
from friends or relatives, as non-taxable.  Except for Social
Security disability income and child support, we assume these
income streams continue, with full adjustments for inflation,
until the respondent’s death.   Social Security disability income
is assumed to end at age 62, when the recipient becomes eligible
for Social Security retirement benefits.  We divide child support
received by the number of children to obtain child support per
child and assume it is received until the child in question
reaches 18.
23  We treat other kinds of special receipts, such as
income from trust funds and royalties, as taxable.  We assume they
will be received for ten years beyond the survey date, and that
the payments will be constant in nominal terms.   Relatively few
respondents receive these kinds of income flows, and the amounts
are generally small relative to average earnings.  We assume that
SCF respondents retire at their stated intended ages of retirement
or age 70, whichever is smaller.   For those who fail to say when
they will retire, we use age 65.
                     
22 For workers who were under 22 in 1995, we assume that 1995 was their first
year of employment.
23 The HRS reports only the sum of child support and spousal support. 
However, we confine our attention to couples, 98 percent of which are married.
 Since spousal support generally ends upon remarriage (and also declines
somewhat on average when individuals become unmarried partners), we can safely
assume that the entire reported amount is child support. 61
Pension Plans, Retirement Accounts, and Social Security.  The SCF
provides information on nominal benefits currently received from
defined benefit pension plans as well as expected nominal benefits
for future pension recipients.  We assume that all pensions are
indexed to inflation and that a surviving spouse would receive 100
percent of the monthly benefit or lump-sum distribution.  We
further assume that employer-sponsored defined contribution plans
and all private retirement accounts (IRAs and Keoghs) provide for
tax-deductible contributions and tax-deferred accumulation. 
Contributions in all future years up to age 59 are set equal, in
real terms, to contributions in the survey year.  If total
contributions are greater than the legal limits ($30,000 or 25% of
income) contributions are truncated.  The proportion given by the
employer remains constant.  Any contributions (by the employee or
the employer) over the legal limit are included in employee non-
deductible and tax-favored contributions. 
The SCF contains information on IRA account balances, but not
annual contributions. We impute contributions based on tobit
regressions from the Consumer Expenditure Survey.  Contributions
are calculated as a function of marital status, work status, age,
earnings, and family size.
If an individual is already receiving Social Security benefits, we
assume that benefits have already started.  Otherwise, we impute
the initial age of benefit receipt as follows.  If the individual
is still working, we assume that benefits will start at his or her
projected retirement age (but not earlier than age 62).  If the
individual is retired, we use the reported start date for those
currently receiving benefits, for those not yet receiving benefits
we assume benefits will start at age 62 for those currently under
62, and at the current age for those over 62.  In all cases, the
initial age of benefit receipt is between 62 and 70.  For
respondents currently receiving social security disability
benefits, we assume that they switch to retirement benefits at age
62.
Our calculations also require information on the age at which
individuals begin to receive private pension benefits. For those
not yet receiving benefits, we use the age at which the individual
expects benefits to begin, as reported in the SCF.
Individuals with previous marriages lasting more than ten years
and ending in divorce or separation and individuals with previous
marriages lasting more than nine months and ending in the spouse’s
death are eligible to receive Social Security benefits based on
the earnings history of their prior spouse.  This presents us with
a problem, since we do not have any information about prior
spouses.  We assume that all such individuals receive benefits
based on either their own earnings history or that of their
current spouse.
Housing. Our calculations require information on a variety of
specific housing expenditures, including mortgages, home insurance62
premiums, property taxes, and other recurring expenses. 
Association fees, homeowner or condo/coop/townhouse association
fees and rent on the site for households owning and living in
mobile homes are added to home insurance premiums to form
recurring house expenditures.  When you own part of a farm, you
are classified as a homeowner.  The rent you pay is then also
added to your insurance premium.   While it does not contain
information on home insurance premiums, it does include the face
amount of insurance.  We imputed annual home insurance premiums by
multiplying by 0.0025 home value. 
If the mortgage payment (minus property taxes and insurance
premium if respondent states these are included in their payments)
is negative then the observation is dropped.  If the annual
property tax is greater than 5% of the home value the observation
is dropped.
With regards to mortgages, the SCF reports the balance remaining,
the number of years remaining, the interest rate, and the payment.
 In order to ensure consistency, we imputed the balance remaining
on the mortgage based on the years remaining and the interest rate
and payment.
In some instances, rental payments reported in the sample include
heat and electricity expenses; in such cases, respondents were not
asked separately about these utility payments.  We apportion the
reported number into separate components by assuming that the
ratio of rent to utilities is the same for these respondents as
the average ratio computed from the Health and Retirement Study. 
If rent includes all utilities, rent is set to 0.77*rent.  If rent
includes some utilities, rent is set to 0.89*rent.  We have no
information on utility expenditure if it is not included in rent.
 The SCF does not include any information concerning property
taxes paid on second homes.  We assume that this property is taxed
at the same rate as the primary home.  Finally, we set monthly
rental payments equal to zero for the few respondents who report
that they live in a house or apartment that they neither rent nor
own.
In addition, for our base case we assume that all households plan
to remain in the same house before and after retirement.  One test
of robustness allows widows and widowers to move to smaller homes.
 For this case we assume that the move to homes that are 70% of
the size of their previous homes.
Other Variables.  For confidentiality reasons, the SCF does not
report the respondent’s date or month of birth or state of
residency.  We assume that each respondent was born on the
fifteenth of June.  For the purposes of computing state taxes, we
use Massachusetts law.  We set the maximum age of life to 95 for
all individuals.  Many households have adult children living with
them.  For the purposes of this project, only children 18 or under
are included. 
We assume for all respondents a fixed amount for funeral expenses63
which is set equal to the median of the reported expenses ($5000)
for HRS spouses for spouses actually died in 1991 (90
observations). The HRS reports information on actual funeral
expenses and legal fees of deceased spouses.  We set intended
bequests equal to zero. 
The SCF allows mortgages to end with a balloon payment.  When
there is a balloon payment, we assume that they refinance for the
amount of the balloon payment with a 15 year mortgage (8% interest
rate).  There is no space in ESP for future mortgages so these are
included in special expenditures. Interest payments on the first
home are included in deductible special expenditures.  Payments on
the balance are included in non-deductible special expenditures. 
Non-deductible special expenditures also include child support or
alimony payment and support to other family members.  These are
assumed to be paid in the current year and the next four years (a
total of 5 years).  Non-deductible special expenditures also
include child support or alimony payment and support to other
family members.  These are assumed to be paid in the current year
and the next four years (a total of 5 years).
As a measure of a household’s net worth, we use total non-housing
assets minus total non-housing liabilities.  Total non-housing
assets include checking and saving accounts, money market funds,
CDs, government saving bonds, T-bills, stocks, mutual funds,
investment trusts, business equity, bonds, bond funds, real estate
other than primary and vacation homes, the cash value of life
insurance policies, and some miscellaneous items.  Total non-
housing liabilities include personal loans, student loans, credit
card balances, car loans, installment loans, and other non housing
debt.  Housing debt (mortgages and equity lines of credit) are
considered separately (see above).  We assume that, apart from
mortgages and other outstanding housing debt, households cannot
borrow against future income.  For our base case, we use a 3
percent rate of inflation and a 3 percent real pre-tax rate of
return.
Credit Constraints.  We assume respondents’ borrowing limit is set
equal to zero
Expected change in living standard.  The expected change in living
standard after retirement or in case of death of one partner is
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